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time leaving the autonomy of the will intact. Instead, part II of the book in
a way operates as a continuation of part I by giving a detailed and careful
description of the problem-together with an intention to bar easy solutions. Thus, Frierson goes on arguing against the possible misunderstanding (at times to be found in the Kant literature) that an empirical assistance
to the development and stabilization of the moral will, although certainly
"needed" in a general way, could be taken as a strictly "necessary" precondition for the very possibility of a good will: "The need for empirical
aids to combat radical evil does not mark an exception to Kant's principle
of 'ought implies can'" (135).
Does Frierson succeed with his project to integrate Kant's anthropology into his moral philosophy? The answer is yes and no. At the conclusion of the book Frierson claims to have shown that "Kant can reconcile
his strong conception of freedom with a robust moral anthropology" (p.
166). Such reconciliation, however, is not tantamount to a full integration.
As Frierson himself repeatedly emphasizes, empirical anthropology and
the concept of freedom cannot be reduced to one another, and the way in
which they relate to each other finally remains opaque. This is not a bad
result since it enhances the awareness of the limits of any empirical inquiry, an insight which, as Frierson persuasively argues, remains relevant
as "a Kantian legacy for today" (165).

Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, by Heiner Bielefeldt.
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 202. $60.00 (cloth).
PATRICK R. FRIERSON, Whitman College

Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy is a sweeping book,
covering a wide variety of important topics in Kant's practical philosophy,
ranging from Kant's categorical imperative to his accounts of history and
religion. The book has eight chapters. In the first, Bielefeldt introduces the
overall purpose of the book in two ways. First, he explains that "the general purpose of this book is to show that Kant's practical philosophy can
help us to develop an appropriate language of liberal ethics in the broadest sense" (3). Second, the book's "purpose ... is to reconstruct the role
that symbolic representation plays in the entire architecture of Kant's practical philosophy" (10). Although Bielefeldt has some provocative hints in
his introduction and conclusion regarding the first point, the second is
really the focus of the book. With the exception of occasional references to
the political dangers of dogmatic or overly skeptical approaches to ethics
(e.g., "bigotry" on p. 32 or "ideological witch hunts" on p. 103), liberalism
does not appear in the core of the book. And Bielefeldt makes no systematic effort to show how the specific way in which Kant uses symbolic representation is well suited to liberal ethics.! Still, this frame sets a context
of political and ethical relevance for what might otherwise be a book of
interest primarily for Kant's scholars.
The second task, of reconstructing the role of symbolic representation in the whole of Kant's philosophy, provides Bielefeldt with a rubric
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within which he stakes out his position on an extremely wide variety of
issues within Kant's practical philosophy. In chapter 2, "Kant's Socratic
Enlightenment," Bielefeldt lays out the overall contours of his approach
to Kant's practical philosophy. He compares Kant to Socrates in several
respects, but the most important is that Kant, like Socrates, seeks to oppose "sophistry," which Bielefeldt connects with both skepticism and
self-deception -" a temptation to push aside ... the claims of morality
by imposing sophistic objections" (24). Bielefeldt rightly suggests that
Kant seeks a way to combat this skeptical sophistry without falling back
into what he calls a "blind defense of virtue" (28), one that would simply
insist upon the rights of virtue without reflection. Kant's "Socratic Enlightenment," Bielefeldt claims, "takes up the skeptical questions raised
by the sophists, but puts them into the broader framework of a systematic scrutiny of morality, a scrutiny that itself presupposes a systematic critique of all faculties of human reason" (28). This Kantian-Socratic
systematic scrutiny of morality leads, Bielefeldt claims, to the Kantian
recognition that morality is something "unconditioned" and therefore
"incomprehensible" (31), and this, for Bielefeldt, leads to the question,
"How can we respect the non-graspability of the unconditioned and, at
the same time, connect it with our daily moral practice?" (32). Bielefeldt's
claim, naturally, is that "Kant's answer ... relies on the deliberate use of
symbolic representation" (33). The rest of the chapter explains how Bielefeldt uses the term "symbolic representation" throughout the book. He
offers a very broad definition of this notion, identifying it with any form
of "indirect discourse" which "points to something that itself remains out
of the reach of direct understanding" (35) as well as with any reasoning
of an "as-if" variety in Kant.
Chapters 3-7 take up different themes in Kant's practical philosophy,
showing how indirect discourse and/or as-if forms of reasoning enter into
Kant's views. These chapters can be divided in terms of general themes as
well as the primary Kantian texts to which they most apply. Thus Chapter
Three focuses on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. It discusses the status of the "fact of reason" (Kant's assertion that "the moral
law constitutes ... a reality that we experience as a kind of facticity" [41]),
the nature of "respect for the moral law," and two of Kant's formulations
of the categorical imperative. Chapter 4, which focuses on the Groundwork and the Doctrine of Virtue, draws on recent work on maxims to show
how the moral law applies in concrete moral practice. Chapter 5 offers a
"symbolic" reading of Kant's political writings, especially the Doctrine of
Right. Chapter 6 examines Kant's Critique of Judgment and historical essays. Like the Critique of Judgment, this chapter covers a range of issues,
from Kant's treatment of the beautiful and sublime to his notions of moral
progress in history. Chapter 7 will likely be the most interesting chapter
for many readers of Faith and Philosophy. Here Bielefeldt turns to Kant's
philosophy of religion, and he covers the full range of Kant's treatment of
religion, from Kant's familiar rejection of "theoretical attempts to prove
God's existence"(154) to the variety of "symbolic" treatments of religion,
including religion'S basis in moral autonomy and the way in which God
is thought of as an author of nature. 2 Bielefeldt also goes considerably further than most scholars in taking seriously the details of Kant's "Critique
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of the Christian Church" (170), including Kantian treatments of "the Bible,
religious dogmas, and religious worship" (171).
Throughout, Bielefeldt seeks to connect his specific treatments of these
themes with symbolic representation. Thus his discussion of the first
formulation of the categorical imperative-"act only in accordance with
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law" (Kant's Groundwork 4:421, Bielefeldt p. 47)-focuses on the
way in which "the unconditionality of the moral command manifests itself symbolically in that strict universal lawfulness that also characterizes
the law of nature" (47-48). This symbolic reading helps Bielefeldt make
sense of why Kant would recast this formulation of the categorical imperative in terms of the laws of nature, and it helps him connect the moral
law more explicitly to Kant's reflections on nature and beauty. Again in his
reading of Kant's political philosophy, Bielefeldt sees "the order of rights
as a symbol of human dignity (96, my emphasis), and more specifically
recasts the "general will" as "a critical symbolism in which the united lawgiving will of the people is applied merely in the as-if mode of indirect
representation" (108).3
In his conclusion, Bielefeldt brings his diverse discussions together into
a brief summary of his overall account:
Rather than presenting a systematic theory or typology of symbols,
Kant clarifies the general status of symbols as an indirect mode of
representation. Whereas in many cases we have different options to
express insights in a direct or an indirect way, the indirect mode of
representation is indispensible whenever it comes to rendering something "supersensible" accessible to the human mind .... [T]his general function of symbolic representation unfolds in very different
ways .... Summing up the main results of this book, I ... focus ...
on four essential purposes that the use of symbols is supposed to
fulfill in Kant's practical philosophy: (1) giving guidelines for moral
judgment, (2) expressing the apodictic force of the moral law, (3)
strengthening a reasonable moral hope, and (4) rendering societal
institutions [including the Church] transparent to their underlying
normative functions. (181)
As should be clear from this summary, Bielefeldt's conclusion is not the
"systematic account of symbolic representation" (10) that was promised in
his introduction. Rather, his book ends up giving something more like a typology of various diverse sorts of indirect discourse, a typology that allows
Bielefeldt to survey virtually the whole of Kant's practical philosophy.
The advantage of this typological approach is that Bielefeldt contributes
his perspective to almost every major debate in contemporary discussions
of Kant's practical philosophy, and the book can serve as a resource for
non-experts to get up to speed on some of the little known gems of Kant's
practical philosophy. For example, Bielefeldt draws attention to the role of
maxims and moral judgment as a way of responding to Hegel's "charge
of emptiness" -that Kant's categorical imperative has no moral content.
Bielefeldt briefly lays out the claim-developed in more detail by Barbara Herman and Onora O'Neill-that maxims and moral judgment help
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"mediate between the universalizability requirement on the one hand and
the concrete lifeworld on the other" (68-69). Another important aspect of
Kant that Bielefeldt highlights is the role that "empirical feelings" such as
"compassion or empathy" play in morality: "Although [they] can never
serve as the normative basis of morality ... , they should be cherished as
support provided by nature to foster our moral obligations" (83). Bielefeldt does not give much detail about how these feelings function as support, but he does point out an aspect of Kant's thought that is increasingly
gaining attention among Kantians (see especially work by Nancy Sherman). Both of these "hidden gems" are hidden only to those outside of
Kantian circles. The importance of moral judgment and empirical feelings
is widely recognized by those whose reading of Kant extends beyond the
Groundwork. But Bielefeldt also discusses some important aspects of Kant
that have not yet been widely noticed even among Kantians. His discussions of Kant's religion still fall into this category, as does his treatment of
the important role of "politeness as symbolic role playing" in Kant (88).
But Bielefeldt's broad scope also has an important disadvantage, in that
it is difficult for the reader to figure out specifically how "symbolic representation" is supposed to unify the book. Partly this is a stylistic problem,
as there are discussions-such as his interesting but apparently tangential
discussion of "what Kant's political philosophy can contribute to contemporary debates on separation of powers" (l14)-that seem interesting but
have no apparent relevance to symbolic representation. But the problem
goes beyond merely the presence of tangents that are insufficiently connected to the overall thread of Bielefeldt's argument. It is clear from his
discussions that Bielefeldt does not limit his use of the term "symbol"
to Kant's own fairly specific (though admittedly underdeveloped) definition of the term in the Critique of Judgment (d. 5:352).4 Kant's account
there makes clear that merely negative judgments, though they may point
to something out of reach, are not symbolic; pure judgments of practical
reason are not symbolic since they do not appeal to any "empirical intuitions" (5:352); and paradoxes and antinomies are not symbolic since they
do not point to anything at all but only highlight a problem. Yet Bielefeldt
makes reference to all three sorts of judgment as forms of indirect discourse that his book will investigate but, alas, not sufficiently distinguish
from one another.
By subsuming all of his quite different topics under the rubric of symbolic representation or indirect discourse, Bielefeldt often makes it harder,
rather than easier, to see how they relate to each other. Early in his book,
for example, Bielefeldt offers this case of "as-if cognition," which in this
context seems to be identified with symbolic representation:
In the Groundwork, for instance, Kant compares the "good will" of
human beings with the "holy will" of an absolute being, as ifhe could
conduct a comparative analysis between man and God, which, as he
has pointed out lucidly in his first Critique, is in fact completely impossible. It would thus be a grave misunderstanding to read Kant's
proposition about the divine will as standing beyond all imperatives
as a theoretical proposition concerning the nahue of God. (36)
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Bielefeldt is certainly correct that interpreting Kant's claim that the divine
will stands beyond all imperatives as a theoretical proposition about God's
nature would be a grave misunderstanding. This is true, first, because any
claim about whether one stands under imperatives is a practical claim,
not a theoretical one. But this hardly makes these claims symbolic, even
if it shows that they are not theoretical. To conflate the "non-theoretical"
with the "symbolic" makes the task of finding symbolic representation in
Kant's practical philosophy trivial. Likewise Bielefeldt is correct that the
first Critique rules out any theoretical proofs of the existence or nature of
God or human wills, but this does not rule out comparative analyses of the
two. In the case of human and holy wills, in fact, Kant quite clearly does
compare these two wills; he does not simply conduct himself" as if" such
a comparison is possible. He specifies precisely how the wills are different, and what practical consequences that has. Of course, his discussion of
the difference in wills is a practical rather than theoretical discussion, and
he makes a practical point with it, but this does not make the discussion
less of a direct comparison.
In another example, Bielefeldt discusses the connection between morality and religion as "a relationship of an indirect (symbolic) connectedness of
different perspectives of meaning" (161). In support of this claim, Bielefeldt argues (rightly) that for Kant "moral obligation does not depend on
religion" (159).5 But this hardly shows that the connection between the
two is indirect, especially since Kant makes quite clear that "morality ...
leads inevitably to religion" (6:6, Bielefeldt p. 159). Bielefeldt seems to be
using the notion of an "indirect" or "symbolic" connection to refer to any
connection other than the one against which he is arguing. That is, unless
the connection were such that morality depended upon religious belief,
the connection must be "indirect." But for Kant, there is a quite direct connection between the two, in that morality justifies belief in God and immortality. And the fact that this justification is practical rather than theoretical does not in itself imply anything "indirect" or "symbolic" about the
connection between morality and religion, nor about the claims of either.
These are just two (of many) examples that show how Bielefeldt's treatment of Kant's practical philosophy does not isolate a specific strand of
"symbolic representation" in anything but a deeply equivocal set of senses of that term. Although he defines "symbolic representation" in terms of
indirect discourse early in the book, the best overview of what Bielefeldt
actually means by this term comes in his taxonomy in the conclusion to
the book. Readers are advised to read this conclusion-perhaps even before reading the rest of the book-as an overview of the central concept
of the book.
Despite this criticism, there are three aspects of the book that will be
of particular interest for readers of Faith and Philosophy. First, Bielefeldt
connects symbolic representation to the more theologically loaded issue
of human fallibility and finitude (e.g., 63, 82, 85, 129, 140, 165). Bielefeldt's
concluding sentences provide some hint of how this focus on human finitude leads to a healthy reading of Kant as proponent of modesty in practical life: "As finite beings, we are ... unable directly to understand how
such an interconnectedness [of human experience and self-understanding] may come about. The critical reflection on moral autonomy, at any
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rate, can give rise to a comprehensive philosophical orientation, which by
confining itself to the modest language of symbolic representation, may be well
suited for preserving the conundrum of the human being's moral vocation" (187-88).
Second, Bielefeldt is one of very few serious Kant scholars to take Kant's
religious writings seriously. And Bielefeldt does not investigate only the
classic Kantian contributions to the philosophy of religion narrowly construed, Kant's arguments against traditional metaphysical argument for
the existence of God and his moral "proof" of God's existence. Instead,
Bielefeldt joins a small but growing contingent of Kantians-including
Kantians as diverse as Allen Wood, John Hare, Philip Quinn, and myselfwho see philosophically important arguments in the details of Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and who read this text as particularly important for a clear understanding of Kant's practical philosophy
as a whole. I would especially encourage readers of Faith and Philosophy
to scan Bielefeldt's seventh chapter to get a sense of the range of issues in
philosophy of religion about which Kant has something important to say.
Finally, and of particular interest for Christian philosophers, Bielefeldt
offers a relatively significant treatment of grace in the context of his overall discussion of Kant's views on religion. Bielefeldt misses some important aspects of Kant's account of grace, such as the role that grace plays in
dealing with radical evil (as described, for example, by Philip Quinn in the
pages of this journal and by myself in Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's
Moral Philosophy). And Bielefeldt reads grace in what I see as an overly
symbolic way, saying that "grace is none other than the nature of the human being insofar as he is determined to actions by a principle which is
intrinsic to his own being" (178). Still, the very fact that Bielefeldt draws
attention to this central Christian doctrine as a central Kantian doctrine is
worth attention.
NOTES

1. Bielefeldt's general contention in his opening discussion of liberalism
is that liberals need a way to engage in "a discussion of 'values,' 'virtue,' and
'faith'" without dogmatism (3). Bielefeldt here picks up on critiques of contemporary liberalism by thinkers such as Charles Larmore (not referenced in
Bielefeldt, but d. Charles Larmore, 'The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism"
in The Journal of Philosophy, December 1999, 96: 599-625). Bielefeldt, like Larmore, argues that liberalism has a moral basis that is often not articulated for
fear of dogmatic moralizing. Unlike Larmore, though, Bielefeldt suggests that
Kant's use of symbolic representation can provide the language that liberalism
needs to avoid the twin shoals of blind dogmatism and empty skepticism.
2. Bielefeldt does not survey Kant's criticisms of traditional metaphysics
here. (Such surveys are common elsewhere, however. See, for example, Allen
Wood's Kant's Philosophical Theology, which has a detailed treatment of these
criticisms.) Instead, he seeks to show how these theoretical arguments for the
existence of God "far from lending strength to religious belief, actually lead
into an abyss of skepticism and unbelief" (154). Thus his focus is on the symbolic-which here means anti-dogmatic - role of these arguments, rather than
their details.
3. Bielefeldt somewhat overstates the contrast between this approach and
what he calls "Rousseau's totalitarian ideology of political salvation" (108),
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but his general point is to emphasize the symbolic nature-by which he here
means "as-if" mode-of Kant's political theory.
4. Bielefeldt references (6-7) Kant's key treatments of the concept of symbol, but he only very briefly discusses (37) the treatment in the Critique of Judg-

ment.
5. Bielefeldt goes a bit further than Kant himself, though, when he argues
that "An atheist is, no less than a religiously committed person, able to listen to
the voice of his or her conscience as well as to actually perform its commandments" (159). Although it would take me too far afield here, Kant's discussion
of Spinoza in the Critique of Judgment strongly suggests that without religious
belief, one will be considerably less likely to obey the moral law.

